Ambisi militer Partai Komunis Tiongkok didukung oleh cadangan tenaga, peralatan, dan dana yang besar.
Rezim Partai Komunis Tiongkok mempertahankan tentara terbesar di dunia, dengan dua juta personel militer aktif. Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat juga memiliki Angkatan Darat terbesar di dunia, jumlah kapal perang terbesar, tonase angkatan laut terberat ketiga, dan angkatan udara yang besar. Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat memiliki kemampuan serangan nuklir trinitas yang terdiri dari rudal balistik antar-benua, kapal selam balistik-rudal, dan pembom strategis.
Rezim Tiongkok juga memiliki 1,7 juta personil polisi bersenjata, yang berada di bawah kepemimpinan terpadu Komisi Militer Pusat Partai Komunis Tiongkok, serta sejumlah besar unit cadangan dan milisi. Doktrin militer Partai Komunis Tiongkok selalu menekankan pentingnya “perang rakyat.”
Di bawah sistem totaliter Partai Komunis Tiongkok, Partai Komunis Tiongkok dapat dengan cepat mengarahkan semua sumber daya yang tersedia ke arah penggunaan militer. Ini berarti bahwa Partai Komunis Tiongkok memiliki lebih dari satu miliar orang (termasuk orang Tionghoa perantauan) di mana dari mereka ini Partai Komunis Tiongkok dapat merekrut sejumlah besar orang ke dalam layanan milisi.
Produk Domestik Bruto Tiongkok meningkat pesat antara tahun 1997 hingga 2007. Partai Komunis Tiongkok mengandalkan kekuatan ekonomi untuk secara cepat memperluas produksi persenjataan dan meningkatkan persenjataannya. Diperkirakan pada tahun 2020, Angkatan Darat Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat akan memiliki lima ribu tank tempur utama modern. Angkatan Laut Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat akan memiliki setidaknya dua kapal induk di armadanya. Sembilan puluh persen dari pejuang Angkatan Udara Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat adalah dari generasi keempat, dan Tiongkok telah mulai memperkenalkan pejuang generasi kelima.
Pada awal tahun 2017, Tiongkok mengumumkan kenaikan anggaran militer tahunan sebesar 6,5 persen yang disesuaikan dengan inflasi menjadi usd 154,3 miliar. Analisis data dari tahun 2008 hingga 2017 menunjukkan anggaran militer resmi Tiongkok tumbuh dengan rata-rata tahunan sebesar 8 persen dalam hal yang disesuaikan dengan inflasi selama periode itu. [113]
Para pengamat memperkirakan bahwa pengeluaran militer aktual Partai Komunis Tiongkok adalah dua kali lipat dari yang diakui secara resmi. Selain itu, kekuatan militer rezim Tiongkok tidak sepenuhnya tercermin dalam pengeluaran militer karena pengeluaran militer sebenarnya lebih tinggi dari angka yang ditampilkan untuk umum, dan Partai Komunis Tiongkok dapat mengambilalih banyak sumber daya dan tenaga sipil sesuai kebijakannya sendiri. Seluruh sistem industri dapat melayani kebutuhan perang, yang berarti kemampuan militernya yang sebenarnya jauh melebihi data resmi dan perkiraan biasa.
Partai Komunis Tiongkok akan membangun sistem global yang terdiri dari lebih dari tiga puluh satelit navigasi Beidou (Big Dipper) pada akhir tahun 2020, dengan kemampuan penentuan posisi militer GPS global. Produksi massal drone militer seri Rainbow melayani tujuan yang lebih penuh siasat bagi Partai Komunis Tiongkok. Misalnya, dalam tata letak Selat Taiwan, Partai Komunis Tiongkok dapat memperoleh keuntungan melalui siasat mesin-laut pesawat tak berawaknya. [114] Sejumlah besar drone udara dapat membentuk kelompok di bawah kendali satelit dan kecerdasan buatan, menjadikan drone udara berguna dalam konflik regional dan asimetris.
Pesawat tempur siluman J-20 milik Tiongkok, yang diluncurkan di Zhuhai Air Show, mirip dengan F-22 Amerika Serikat, sedangkan Chinese J-31 muncul dengan model F-35. Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat sederajat dengan Amerika Serikat dalam mengembangkan jet tempur modern.
Selain itu, Partai Komunis Tiongkok menggunakan berbagai aktivitas spionase untuk mengejar ketinggalan teknologi dengan Amerika Serikat. Menurut beberapa perkiraan baru-baru ini, lebih dari 90 persen spionase terhadap Amerika Serikat yang dilakukan melalui peretasan berasal dari Tiongkok, dan jaringan Partai Komunis Tiongkok menyusup ke perusahaan-perusahaan besar dan militer Amerika Serikat, mencuri teknologi dan pengetahuan yang tidak dapat dikembangkan oleh Tiongkok secara mandiri. [115] Teknologi pesawat tak berawak Tiongkok dicuri dari Amerika Serikat.
Dalam hal siasat, Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat tertarik pada kemampuan asimetris: Perang asimetris, strategi asimetris, dan senjata asimetris. [116] Laksamana Philip S. Davidson, komandan baru Komando Indo-Pasifik, menggambarkan Tiongkok sebagai “pesaing sebaya.” Ia mengatakan bahwa Tiongkok tidak berusaha menyamai daya tembak Amerika Serikat dengan rasio satu banding satu; namun, Tiongkok berusaha mengejar Amerika Serikat dengan membangun kemampuan asimetris yang kritis, termasuk penggunaan rudal anti-kapal dan kemampuan dalam perang kapal selam. Ia memperingatkan bahwa “tidak ada jaminan bahwa Amerika Serikat akan memenangkan konflik dengan Tiongkok di masa depan.” [117]
Partai Komunis Tiongkok mengandalkan penelitian dan pengembangan rudal Dongfeng 21D (rudal balistik anti-kapal untuk digunakan menghadapi kapal induk Amerika Serikat) untuk melakukan konfrontasi mode-sniper serupa. Pada tahun 2018, Partai Komunis Tiongkok secara terbuka memperlihatkan rudal anti-kapal supersonik Eagle-Attack-12B berbasis darat, yang dikenal sebagai “pembunuh kapal induk.”
Eagle-Attack-12B telah menarik “zona kematian” sepanjang 550 kilometer di barat Pasifik, di mana kelompok tempur pembawa milik Amerika Serikat akan rentan terhadap serangan saturasi ketinggian-rendah. Rudal ini menjadi sarana militer penting dari operasi penolakan regional Tentara Pembebasan Rakyat yang bertujuan mencegah intervensi militer Amerika Serikat.
Mengikuti ekspansi kekuatan militernya yang cepat, rezim Partai Komunis Tiongkok telah menjadi pengekspor senjata besar ke rezim otoriter dunia, seperti Korea Utara dan rezim jahat di Timur Tengah. Di satu sisi, tujuan Partai Komunis Tiongkok adalah untuk memperluas aliansi militernya, dan di sisi lain, untuk membubarkan dan melawan kekuatan militer Amerika Serikat. Rezim Partai Komunis Tiongkok menyebar serta mendorong sentimen dan kebencian anti-Amerika Serikat. Sangat mudah bagi Partai Komunis Tiongkok untuk bersatu dengan rezim anti-Amerika Serikat lainnya untuk melanjutkan ambisi hegemoniknya.
Pada saat yang sama, kepemimpinan Partai Komunis Tiongkok mendukung teori militer teroris seperti perang tanpa batas. Partai Komunis Tiongkok menganjurkan perlunya perang dengan mengatakan bahwa “perang tidak jauh dari kita; perang adalah tempat kelahiran ‘abad Tiongkok.’
“Perang melegitimasi kekerasan dan teror dengan kata-kata seperti “orang mati adalah kekuatan pendorong untuk kemajuan sejarah.” Perang membenarkan agresi dengan perkataan “tidak ada hak untuk berkembang tanpa hak untuk berperang” dan “pengembangan satu negara menimbulkan ancaman bagi negara lain – ini adalah aturan umum sejarah dunia.”[118]
Zhu Chenghu, dekan Fakultas Pertahanan Universitas Pertahanan Nasional Republik Rakyat Tiongkok, secara terbuka menyatakan bahwa jika Amerika Serikat campur tangan dalam perang di Selat Taiwan, Tiongkok akan menggunakan senjata nuklir untuk menghancurkan ratusan kota di Amerika Serikat, walaupun seandainya seluruh Tiongkok hingga di sebelah timur Xi’an (sebuah kota yang terletak di tepi barat batas tradisional Tiongkok) hancur sebagai konsekuensinya. [119] Pernyataan Zhu Chenghu adalah tampilan publik dari ambisi Partai Komunis Tiongkok dan sarana untuk menyelidiki reaksi komunitas internasional.
Penting untuk menyadari fakta bahwa strategi militer Partai Komunis Tiongkok selalu berada di bawah kebutuhan politiknya, dan bahwa ambisi militer rezim Partai Komunis Tiongkok hanyalah sebagian kecil dari skema keseluruhannya. Pendekatan Partai Komunis Tiongkok adalah bergantung pada sarana ekonomi dan militer untuk memaksakan ideologi komunisnya ke seluruh dunia. [120]
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[25] Ibid.
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[65] Nick Timothy, “The Government Is Selling Our National Security to China,” Conservative Home, October 20, 2015, http://www.conservativehome.com/thecolumnists/2015/10/nick-timothy-the-government-is-selling-our-national-security-to-china.html.
[66] Holly Watt, “Hinkley Point: The ‘Dreadful Deal’ behind the World’s Most Expensive Power Plant,” The Guardian, December 21, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/dec/21/hinkley-point-c-dreadful-deal-behind-worlds-most-expensive-power-plant.
[67] Lin Ping [林坪] “Disclosing China’s Sharp Power (Part XII) Economic Infiltration in Europe,” Radio Free Asia, November 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/zhuantixilie/zhongguochujiaoshenxiangshijie/yl-11082018122750.html; “Disclosing China’s Sharp Power (Part XIII) The Encroachment of Academic Freedom and Freedom of Speech in Europe,” Radio Free Asia, November 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/zhuanlan/zhuantixilie/zhongguochujiaoshenxiangshijie/MCIEU-11122018165706.html. [林坪：〈揭祕中國銳實力（十二）在歐洲的經濟滲透〉，《自由亞洲電台》] [〈揭祕中國銳實力（十三）歐洲學術、言論自由〉，《自由亞洲電台》] [In Chinese]
[68] Jack Hazlewood, “China Spends Big on Propaganda in Britain … but Returns Are Low,” Hong Kong Free Press, April 3, 2016, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/04/03/china-spends-big-on-propaganda-in-britain-but-returns-are-low/.
[69] Thorsten Benner et al., “Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe,” Global Public Policy Institute (GPPI), February 2018, https://www.gppi.net/media/Benner_MERICS_2018_Authoritarian_Advance.pdf.
[70] Christophe Cornevin and Jean Chichizola, “The Revelations of Le Figaro on the Chinese Spy Program That Targets France” [“Les révélations du Figaro sur le programme d’espionnage chinois qui vise la France”], Le Figaro, October 22, 2018, http://www.lefigaro.fr/actualite-france/2018/10/22/01016-20181022ARTFIG00246-les-revelations-du-figaro-sur-le-programme-d-espionnage-chinois-qui-vise-la-france.php. [In French]
[71] “German Spy Agency Warns of Chinese LinkedIn Espionage,” BBC News, December 10, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42304297.
[72] Serge Michel and Michel Beuret, China Safari: On the Trail of Beijing’s Expansion in Africa (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 162.
[73] Reuben Brigety, “A Post-American Africa,” Foreign Affairs, August 28, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2018-08-28/post-american-africa.
[74] “Not as Bad as They Say” The Economist, October 1, 2011, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2011/10/01/not-as-bad-as-they-say.
[75] Joseph Hammond, “Sudan: China’s Original Foothold in Africa,” The Diplomat, June 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/sudan-chinas-original-foothold-in-africa/.
[76] Zeng Yong, “A Strategic Analysis of China’s Dealing with the Darfur Crisis,” Arab World Studies, November 2012 Issue #6, http://mideast.shisu.edu.cn/_upload/article/23/47/8ee05ca2405488f615e514184f73/077159aa-8c97-41b8-bcc3-95c22c3ba732.pdf. [曾勇，〈中國處理達爾富爾危機的戰略分析〉，《阿拉伯世界研究》] [In Chinese]
[77] “Beijing Shows Hospitality to the Wanted Sudanese President Bashir,” Radio France Internationale (RFI), June 29, 2011, http://cn.rfi.fr/中國/20110629-北京盛情款待遭通緝的蘇丹總統巴希爾. [〈北京盛情款待遭通緝的蘇丹總統巴希爾〉，《法廣》] [In Chinese]
[78] According to “China’s Path of Peaceful Development” by the Information Office of the State Council, as of 2005, China had waived the debts of forty-four developing countries, totalling about 16.6 billion yuan. http://www.scio.gov.cn/zfbps/ndhf/2005/Document/307900/307900.htm. [In Chinese]
[79] Pan Xiaotao, “Chinese, Get Ready to Give Out More Money,” Apple Daily, August 31, 2018, https://hk.news.appledaily.com/local/daily/article/20180831/20488504. [潘小濤：〈中國人，請準備再大撒幣〉，《蘋果日報》] [In Chinese]
[80] “Ministry of Commerce: 97 Percent of Products in 33 Least-Developed Countries in Africa Enjoy Zero Tariffs,” China News, August 28, 2018, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2018/08-28/8612256.shtml. [〈商務部：非洲33個最不發達國家97%的產品享受零關稅〉，《中新網》] [In Chinese]
[81] Jia Ao, “China Gives Africa Big Bucks Again and America Gets Alert,” Radio Free Asia, September 3, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/hc-09032018110327.html. [家傲：〈中國再向非洲大撒幣 美國警覺〉，《自由亞洲電台》] [In Chinese]
[82] Quan Ye, “A Dialogue With Wang Wen: From the Theory of Spending Money to the Real Problem Behind the Misconstrued New Colonialism,” Duowei News, September 2, 2018, http://news.dwnews.com/china/news/2018-09-02/60081911_all.html. [泉野：〈對話王文：從撒錢論到「新殖民主義」誤區背後的真問題〉，《多維》] [In Chinese]
[83] Cai Linzhe, “Ethiopia Is Learning the ‘Chinese Model,’” Phoenix Weekly, May 15, 2013, http://www.ifengweekly.com/detil.php?id=403. [蔡臨哲：〈埃塞俄比亞學習「中國模式」〉，《鳳凰週刊》] [In Chinese]
[84] Andrew Harding, “Correspondence from Our Reporters: ‘A New China’ in Africa,” BBC Chinese, July 27, 2015, https://www.bbc.com/ukchina/simp/fooc/2015/07/150727_fooc_ethiopia_development. [安德魯‧哈丁：〈記者來鴻：非洲出了個「新中國」〉，《BBC中文網》] [In Chinese]
[85] Si Yang, “To Win the Right to Speak and Export the ‘Chinese Model,’ China Resorts to Different Means in Europe-America and Asia-Africa,” Voice of America, December 7, 2018, https://www.voachinese.com/a/4420434.html. [斯洋：〈爭奪話語權，輸出中國模式，中國影響歐美和亞非方式大不同〉，《美國之音》] [In Chinese]
[86] Ted Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America,” Order From Chaos: Foreign Policy in a Troubled World, November 2016, 4 and 9, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/the-geopolitics-of-chinas-rise-in-latin-america_ted-piccone.pdf.
[87] Alfonso Serrano, “China Fills Trump’s Empty Seat at Latin America Summit,” The New York Times, April 17, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/13/opinion/china-trump-pence-summit-lima-latin-america.html.
[88] Translated from Chinese version of the paper by Jorge Blázquez-Lidoy, Javier Rodríguez, Javier Santiso, “Angel o demonio? Los efectos del comercio chino en los países de América Latina” [Angel or Demon? The Effects of Chinese Trade in Latin American Countries], https://repositorio.cepal.org/bitstream/handle/11362/11135/090017043_es.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [in Spanish].
[89] Jordan Wilson, China’s Military Agreements with Argentina: A Potential New Phase in China-Latin America Defense Relations, U.S-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, November 5, 2015, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%27s%20Military%20Agreements%20with%20Argentina.pdf.
[90] Jin Yusen, “The CCP’s Dollar Diplomacy May Be the Last Straw,” watchinese.com, July 5, 2017, https://www.watchinese.com/article/2017/23053. [金雨森：〈中共金錢外交恐成為最後一根稻草〉，《看雜誌》] [In Chinese]
[91] Ibid.
[92] “The CCP’s Huge Amount of Financial Aid to El Salvador Causes Anxiety for America,” NTD Television, August 22, 2018, http://www.ntdtv.com/xtr/gb/2018/08/23/a1388573.html. [〈中共巨額金援搶薩爾瓦多 引美國憂慮〉，新唐人電視台] [In Chinese]
[93] Huang Xiaoxiao, “Number of Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the Caribbeans Increases to 39,” People.cn, January 26, 2018, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0126/c1002-29788625.htm. [ 黃瀟瀟：〈拉美和加勒比地區孔子學院達39所〉，《人民網》] [In Chinese]
[94] Sharon Weinberger, “China Has Already Won the Drone Wars,” Foreign Policy, May 10, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/10/china-trump-middle-east-drone-wars/.
[95] Rick Joe, “China’s Air Force on the Rise: Zhuhai Airshow 2018,” The Diplomat, November 13, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/chinas-air-force-on-the-rise-zhuhai-airshow-2018/.
[96] Huang Yuxiang 黃宇翔： “Chinese Drones, Whose Target Is America, Stun the Audience at Zhuhai Air Show,” Asia Weekly, November 25, 2018, Issue #46, Vol. 32, https://www.yzzk.com/cfm/blogger3.cfm?id=1542252826622&author=%E9%BB%83%E5%AE%87%E7%BF%94. [黃宇翔：〈中國無人戰機驚豔珠海航展亮相假想敵是美國〉，《亞洲週刊》] [In Chinese]
[97] “Pentagon Says Chinese Vessels Harassed U.S. Ship,” CNN, March 9, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/09/us.navy.china/index.html.
[98] Barbara Starr, “Chinese Boats Harassed U.S. Ship, Officials Say,” CNN, May 5, 2009, http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/05/05/china.maritime.harassment/index.html.
[99] Barbara Starr, Ryan Browne and Brad Lendon, “Chinese Warship in ‘Unsafe’ Encounter With US Destroyer, Amid Rising US-China Tensions,” CNN, October 1, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/01/politics/china-us-warship-unsafe-encounter/index.html.
[100] Military Strategy Research Department of the Academy of Military Science: Strategic Studies, Beijing: Military Science Publishing House, 2013, p. 47. [軍事科學院軍事戰略研究部：《戰略學》（北京：軍事科學出版社，2013）] [In Chinese]
[101] Qiao Liang, “The ‘Belt and Road’ Strategy Must Take Into Consideration the ‘Going Out’ of Military Power,” 81.cn, April 15, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-04/15/content_6443998_5.ht. [喬良：〈「一帶一路」戰略要考慮軍事力量走出去問題〉，《中國軍網》] [In Chinese]
[102] Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, U.S. Department of Defense, May 16, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF, 46, 47.
[103] Benjamin Haas, “Steve Bannon: ‘We’re Going to War in the South China Sea … No Doubt,’” The Guardian, February 1, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doubt.
[104] Lawrence Sellin, “The US Needs a New Plan to Address Chinese Power in Southern Asia,” The Daily Caller, June 5, 2018, https://dailycaller.com/2018/06/05/afghanistan-pakistan-america-china/.
[105] Panos Mourdoukoutas, “China Will Lose The South China Sea Game,” Forbes, July 1, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2018/07/01/china-will-lose-the-south-china-sea-game/#5783cad73575.
[106] Michael Lelyveld, “China’s Oil Import Dependence Climbs as Output Falls,” Radio Free Asia, December 4, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/energy_watch/chinas-oil-import-dependence-climbs-as-output-falls-12042017102429.html.
[107] M. Taylor Fravel, “Why Does China Care So Much about the South China Sea? Here Are 5 Reasons,” The Washington Post, July 13, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/13/why-does-china-care-so-much-about-the-south-china-sea-here-are-5-reasons/?utm_term=.4a7b1de04dbd.
[108] Ibid.
[109] Brahma Chellaney, “Why the South China Sea Is Critical to Security,” The Japan Times, March 26, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/03/26/commentary/world-commentary/south-china-sea-critical-security/#.XAnOBBNKiF1.
[110] Scott L. Montgomery, “Oil, History, and the South China Sea: A Dangerous Mix,” Global Policy, August 7, 2018, https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/07/08/2018/oil-history-and-south-china-sea-dangerous-mix.
[111] Hal Brands, “China’s Master Plan: a Global Military Threat,” The Japan Times, June 12, 2018, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/12/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-master-plan-global-military-threat/#.W9JPPBNKj5V.
[112] Lin Tinghui, “The Dragon in Strange Waters: China’s Diplomatic Quagmire in the Pacific Islands,” Journal on International Relations, July 2010, Issue #30, p. 58, https://diplomacy.nccu.edu.tw/download.php?filename=451_b9915791.pdf&dir=archive&title=File. [林廷輝，〈龍在陌生海域：中國對太平洋島國外交之困境〉，《國際關係學報》第三十期（2010年7月）] [In Chinese]
[113] Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2018, U.S. Department of Defense, May 16, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT.PDF.
[114] Huang Yuxiang, “Chinese Drones, Whose Target Is America, Stun the Audience at Zhuhai Air Show,” Asia Weekly, November 25, 2018, 第32卷 46期，, https://www.yzzk.com/cfm/blogger3.cfm?id=1542252826622&author=%E9%BB%83%E5%AE%87%E7%BF%94. [黃宇翔：〈中國無人戰機驚艷珠海航展亮相假想敵是美國〉，《亞洲週刊》，2018年11月25日， 第32卷 46期] [In Chinese]
[115] David E. Sanger, “U.S. Blames China’s Military Directly for Cyberattacks,” The New York Times, May 6, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/world/asia/us-accuses-chinas-military-in-cyberattacks.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
[116] See in-depth analysis of this issue by Peter Navarro, director of the White House National Trade Council, in Crouching Tiger: What China’s Militarism Means for the World (New York: Prometheus Books, 2015).
[117] Steven Lee Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China Is Ready to Challenge U.S. Navy in Pacific,” The New York Times, August 29, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-pacific.html.
[118] See San Renxing, “On the Bloody Company’s (CCP’s) Doomsday Mad Gambling,” The Epoch Times, http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/5/8/1/n1003911.htm [三人行：〈評血腥公司的末日瘋狂賭〉，《大紀元新聞網》] [In Chinese] and http://www.epochtimes.com/b5/5/8/2/n1004823.htm; and Li Tianxiao, “If God Wants the CCP to Die, He Will Make It Mad First,” The Epoch Times, http://www.epochtimes.com/gb/5/8/17/n1021109.htm. [李天笑：〈神要中共亡 必先使其狂〉，《大紀元新聞網》] [In Chinese]
The two speeches allegedly made by the CCP general Chi Haotian (Minister of Defense, 1993-2003), “The War Is Coming to Us” and “The War Is Not Far from Us; It Is the Midwife of the Chinese Century,” appeared on the internet in 2003 and 2005 respectively. While it is difficult to verify their authenticity, critics generally believe that the speeches represent the true mentality of the Chinese Communist Party, and that they were deliberately released to gauge external reactions and intimidate enemies.
[119] Jonathan Watts, “Chinese General Warns of Nuclear Risk to US,” The Guardian, July 15 2005, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jul/16/china.jonathanwatts.
[120] Michael Pillsbury was surprised to find that, when Chinese scholars assess the country’s power, military strength accounted for less than 10 percent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CCP changed its criteria for evaluating strength and incorporated factors such as economy, overseas investment, technological innovation, and natural resources. Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, Chapter 2.
